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A B S T R A C T
Doctors' work and the changing, contested meanings of medical professionalism have long been a focus for
sociological research. Much recent attention has focused on those doctors working at the interface between
healthcare management and medical practice, with such ‘hybrid’ doctor-managers providing valuable analytical
material for exploring changes in how medical professionalism is understood. In the United Kingdom, significant
structural changes to medical regulation, most notably the introduction of revalidation in 2012, have created a
new hybrid group, Responsible Officers (ROs), responsible for making periodic recommendations about the on-
going fitness to practise medicine of all other doctors in their organisation.
Using qualitative data collected in a 2015 survey with 374 respondents, 63% of ROs in the UK, this paper
analyses the RO role. Our findings show ROs to be a distinct emergent group of hybrid professionals and as such
demonstrate restructuring within UK medicine. Occupying a position where multiple agendas converge, ROs'
work expands professional regulation into the organisational sphere in new ways, as well as creating new lines of
continuous accountability between the wider profession and the General Medical Council as medical regulator.
Our exploration of ROs' approaches to their work offers new insights into the on-going development of medical
professionalism, pointing to the emergence of a distinctly regulatory hybrid professionalism shaped by co-ex-
isting professional, managerial and regulatory logics, in an era of strengthened governance and complex policy
change.
1. Introduction
Doctors' work and the changing, contested meaning of medical
professionalism have long been a focus for researchers, and in recent
years the medical profession's place in relation to reconfigured models
of healthcare management and governance has generated extensive
interest. Much attention has centred on those doctors working at the
interface between healthcare management and medical practice, and
has demonstrated that such ‘hybrid’ doctor-managers provide valuable
analytic material for exploring changes in how medical professionalism
is understood (Kuhlmann et al., 2013; McGivern et al., 2015;
Noordegraaf et al., 2016; Waring, 2014). Such work has recognised,
amongst some international commonalities, the importance of sig-
nificant national specificities, particularly when analysing relationships
between professionals and states or organisations (Bezes et al., 2012).
Here, we seek to add to such critiques by exploring the implementation
of regulatory reforms in the United Kingdom (UK), which have, for the
first time, placed considerable statutory powers and duties in the hands
of a nominated medical professional in each organisation employing or
contracting with doctors, formally titled the ‘Responsible Officer’ (RO).
First, we set out the background and context to this development,
describing in overview the nature of the reforms leading to these
changes. We then draw on theories of professional restratification,
Foucault's concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991), and research
on hybrid professionals to frame our analysis of the RO role, with a
particular focus on their responsibility for the implementation of
medical revalidation, a new regulatory mechanism in place since 2012.
Using this theoretical framework, this paper analyses qualitative data
from a national survey of ROs, and discusses the insights these new
hybrid professionals offer for understanding professional responses to
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1.1. Regulatory reform and the medical profession
The creation of the RO role, and the introduction of revalidation,
notably changed how medical practice in the UK is regulated; the latest
in a series of policy shifts affecting the governance of the medical
profession. Historically, medicine operated a model of self-regulation
both formally and informally, at group and individual levels
(Chamberlain, 2009). Practitioners were expected to regulate them-
selves by practising in accordance with shared professional standards
(Waring, 2007). Since 1858, the General Medical Council (GMC) has
controlled professional registration, and assured standards of medical
education. Through its Fitness to Practise (FTP) procedures, the GMC
investigates allegations of poor performance or misconduct. However,
traditionally much management of poor performance occurred locally
and informally, relying on collegiate discussions and ‘in-house’ resolu-
tion rather than formal regulatory mechanisms (Rosenthal, 1995).
Moran (2003) characterised this as ‘club regulation’, a lasting expres-
sion of the Victorian regulatory state, focused on maintaining good
relations within the profession. The profession was thus entrusted with
regulating its membership by the state and society, in a ‘a neat and
powerful arrangement’ (Salter, 2001).
Latterly, however, this arrangement has altered dramatically, with a
move towards bureaucratic regulatory oversight (Waring et al., 2010),
pointing to some erosion of professional autonomy (Dixon-Woods et al.,
2011), and the profession no longer solely responsible for its own
regulation. Broad consensus exists on the contributing factors that
converged to politicise medical regulation and create an appetite for
change. First, since the 1980s, successive governments' adoption of neo-
liberal New Public Management (NPM) principles extended state in-
terest in healthcare delivery and organisation, and consequently in
monitoring clinical standards (Waring et al., 2010). Concurrently,
emergent patient groups (Mold, 2010) contributed to scepticism about
medical authority (Salter, 2001). Finally, high profile malpractice
scandals in the 1990s and 2000s raised doubts about the profession's
ability to self-regulate effectively (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Salter,
2007; Waring, 2007). Consequently, in the 2000s, the GMC was re-
constituted to reduce medical dominance, and gained powers to oversee
not just professional misconduct but poor performance.
The changed political mood added impetus to long-mooted plans for
revalidation (Archer et al., 2015), accompanied by the creation of the
RO role, whose origins lay in GMC proposals that revalidation should
entail local certification of doctors' participation, by an organisational
representative, such as the Medical Director or Chief Executive (Smith,
2004). Following the Shipman Inquiry's criticism of GMC plans,
strengthened new proposals, more clearly defining the responsibilities
associated with local assurance of revalidation, and assigning these to a
specific new RO role, were set out by the Chief Medical Officer
(Department of Health, 2008). Subsequent legislation (Health and
Social Care Act, 2008) required organisations employing or contracting
with doctors to appoint an RO before revalidation was introduced in
2012.
1.2. Responsible Officers and regulation
Revalidation aims to monitor doctors' fitness to practise throughout
their careers. Comparable schemes exist or are under consideration
internationally (Boulet and van Zanten, 2014; Sehlbach et al., 2018),
marking a notable trend towards continuing assessment of competency.
However, the RO role is a striking feature of the UK medical regulatory
system, when compared to others internationally (Archer and Regan De
Bere, 2013).
Revalidation requires doctors to document their practice and par-
ticipate in annual appraisals (General Medical Council, 2012). Their RO
then brings appraisal information together with other clinical
governance data to make a formal recommendation to the GMC, usually
every fifth year (General Medical Council, 2015). ROs may recommend
that doctors be revalidated, or that their revalidation be deferred, or
notify the GMC that the doctor has not engaged. Using this re-
commendation, the GMC decides whether to renew the doctor's licence
to practise.
Greenhalgh and Wong (2011) described the revalidation process as
essentially technical and bureaucratic, aligned with scientific-bureau-
cratic medicine, including increased managerialism. Its introduction
was contested from within the profession (Archer et al., 2015), due to
fears of its reductive impact on professional autonomy and the chal-
lenge of reconciling formative appraisal processes with a summative
regulatory mechanism (Archer et al., 2017). Subsequently, amongst
those in leadership positions at least, previously conflicting discourses
of professionalism and regulation have converged, driven by the leg-
islative imperative to implement the policy (Tazzyman et al., 2018).
However, positioning revalidation as a policy move from embodied
trust in professionals to state enforceable trust, Spendlove (2018)
identified continued professional resistance manifested in doctors' for-
malistic approaches to engagement.
The approximately 600 ROs are intrinsic to this regulatory process
and must also monitor the fitness to practise of doctors connected to
their organisation (The Medical Profession (Responsible Officers)
Regulations, 2010). They work for organisations ranging from those
with just a few connected doctors to those with several thousand, across
NHS, independent and third sector settings (NHS England, 2016). In
most cases, the role is held by the Medical Director (MD) or Deputy
Medical Director. Some, often smaller, organisations contract out the
role, and some ROs fill the role for multiple organisations.
1.3. Interpreting professional responses to regulatory reform
Existing research on ROs has typically focused on the practicalities
of their work, particularly during early implementation (Nath et al.,
2014; Shepherd and Cameron, 2010; Webster and McLachlan, 2011), or
on their own experiences of undergoing appraisal (Furmedge et al.,
2016; Griffin et al., 2015). In this paper, we analyse the RO role in the
light of theoretical interpretations of comparable hybrid doctor-man-
ager groups, to better understand their position at the interface of this
fundamentally changed relationship between medical regulation and
healthcare organisations.
In some quarters, the curtailment of professional self-regulation has
been seen, alongside increased managerial scrutiny of medical work, as
having fundamentally undermined professional autonomy, as part of an
international trend of ‘deprofessionalization’ (Bezes et al., 2012;
Schlesinger, 2002). The diffusion of NPM principles brought an ex-
pansion of non-medical management in healthcare and new systems of
performance management and financial control of medical practice
(Ackroyd et al., 2007). However, as Le Bianic (2012) notes, analyses
focusing solely on reduced autonomy position professionals as ‘passive
agents of reform’ and ‘frontally opposed’ to managerialism. Alternative
analyses have foregrounded more active professional responses to this
changed political and social environment. Particular attention has fo-
cused on the emergence of clinical managers as new professional elites
operating at the intersection between the medical profession and or-
ganisations (Cascón-Pereira et al., 2016; Correia and Denis, 2016;
Kuhlmann et al., 2013; Martin and Waring, 2013). Such ‘hybrids’
(McGivern et al., 2015) offer insights how the medical profession has
responded to regulatory and organisational reforms. Theoretical inter-
pretations have centred on two concepts: restratification and govern-
mentality.
Developed in response to the perceived threat of deprofessionali-
zation, the restratification thesis (Freidson, 1985, 1994, 2001) posited
that elite groups would operate oversight and control over the mass, or
‘rank and file’, of their profession. For Freidson, professionalism was a
‘third logic’ by which professional work may be controlled, existing
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alongside and in competition with economic market forces and man-
agerial bureaucracy (Freidson, 2001), and it was through the internal
restructuring of restratification that collective autonomy would be
maintained. Professional elites would mediate between the profession
and the state, working to safeguard professional interests (Chamberlain,
2013; Waring, 2014).
Freidson's delineation of restratification identified a ‘knowledge
elite’, focused on professional education, research and setting profes-
sional standards, and an ‘administrative elite’, responsible for managing
professionals' work activity. Importantly, the retention of professional
autonomy is linked to recognition that expert knowledge is requisite for
some activities, restricting some roles to those from within the profes-
sion (Freidson, 2001). The RO role is one such function, reserved for
those holding medical qualifications, though this may be as much to
maintain regulatory oversight over role-holders as any need for medical
expertise.
Restratification has been used to understand changes in the medical
profession (Chamberlain, 2014), and particularly the position of doctor-
managers, though applied analysis has highlighted the need for
nuanced understanding of how professional strata manifest with spe-
cific settings (McDonald et al., 2009). Waring (2014) has further de-
veloped Freidson's categories, suggesting, amongst other variations,
that the ‘administrative elite’ may now be better viewed as encom-
passing subgroups – a ‘managerial elite’ and a ‘governance elite’. This
revised categorisation offers a more refined framework in which to
place new professional roles, including ROs. Specifically, Waring
(2014) identifies the ‘governance elite’ as ‘a growing professional
stratum that reflects the sub-specialisation of managerial elites’, with
responsibility for monitoring and safeguarding professional standards,
and functioning as a link to external regulatory bodies and organisa-
tional management.
Often discussed alongside restratification, governmentality
(Foucault, 1977, 1991) holds that adopting externally imposed stan-
dards may engender their internalisation, whether by individuals
(Waring, 2007) or the profession, acting as a conduit for state ‘gov-
ernance’ power (Chamberlain, 2013). This internalisation of external
expectations constitutes self-surveillance, reducing or negating the need
for further external oversight (Exworthy, 2015). Applying this inter-
pretive lens positions managerial or governance elites as those oper-
ating surveillance over their peers (Waring, 2014), and has clear re-
levance for ROs, who fulfil legislative requirements to oversee medical
performance as part of a regulatory system. The surveillance of doctors'
performance is thus still situated within the profession, though the
regulatory drivers for the surveillance are ‘owned’ by the GMC and
aligned to state aims (Waring, 2007).
Interpretation of professional elites' activities as evidencing re-
stratification, governmentality, or some combination of these two ab-
stract theses typically rests on investigating how role-holders self-
identify and behave. McGivern et al. (2015) found distinct patterns
amongst doctor-manager hybrids, distinguishing ‘incidental hybrids’
from ‘willing hybrids’, where ‘willing hybrids’ had assimilated organi-
sational priorities and actively sought to develop the managerial as-
pects of their work and identities. Such willing hybrids may be seen as
embodying ‘organisational professionalism’ (Evetts, 2009), working
within organisational hierarchies and systems for the control of pro-
fessional work. Research into the identity work of hybrid professionals
has highlighted that identity formation in doctor-managers is strongly
influenced by contextual and institutional factors (Cascón-Pereira et al.,
2016; Currie et al., 2009; Correia and Denis, 2016). Organisational
context has been identified elsewhere as an important element in
shaping how ROs' make revalidation recommendations (Webster and
McLachlan, 2011).
Hybrid professionals have also been presented as representing ne-
gotiation and convergence between professional and managerial cul-
tures (Numerato et al., 2012), and as working across and between both
domains rather than as maintaining or adopting a singular position on
one side of a binary divide (Noordegraaf et al., 2016). In such cases,
managerial and professional discourses overlap, as hybrid professionals
serve multiple agendas simultaneously and sometimes ambiguously
(Olakivi and Niska, 2017). In this way, professional work is multi-di-
mensional and may be shaped, within a specific context or setting, by
‘co-existing logics’ which may be competing or convergent (McDonald
et al., 2013).
Professional, managerial and regulatory logics, and linked dis-
courses, have been identified in relation to revalidation (Archer et al.,
2015; Greenhalgh and Wong, 2011; Tazzyman et al., 2018). We
therefore draw upon the abstract theoretical frameworks offered by
existing restratification and governmentality-informed perspectives on
professional hybridity to underpin an applied analysis addressing two
connected questions. Firstly, we ask whether ROs constitute a distinct
professional elite group and, secondly, we explore whether role-holders
undertake their work in defence of profession autonomy, in pursuit of
organisational or regulatory priorities, or operate through an in-
tegrative hybrid professionalism.
2. Methods
This paper presents an analysis of qualitative data collected through
a UK-wide survey of ROs, from which overview findings are reported
elsewhere (Walshe et al., 2017). The survey, conducted online between
July and September 2015 using Qualtrics (2015), was distributed to
595 ROs as part of a wider study evaluating medical revalidation and its
impacts on organisational performance and medical practice. Ethical
approval for this study was awarded by the University of Manchester
ethics committee (REC 15028).
Numeric, rating scale and free text data were collected, focusing on
four key areas:
• Individual, organisational and external resources for revalidation;
• Organisational systems for managing medical performance;
• How revalidation recommendations to the GMC are made;
• The implementation and impact of revalidation.
Responses were received from 374 ROs (63%), though responses
were lower from ROs for organisations with less than 20 doctors and
locum agencies at just under 50%. A majority of respondents (64%)
held RO and Medical Director roles concurrently, six percent were RO
and Deputy Medical Director, and seventeen percent held other senior
management roles. Initial analysis of the survey data included thematic
analysis of the free text data, using a template analysis approach (King,
2012). Using Dedoose (2016) web application for managing and ana-
lysing qualitative and mixed methods research data, a coding frame-
work was developed inductively from 40 respondents' comments by five
researchers (MB, KL, AB, AT, JTR). The initial framework was discussed
and revised, and the resultant coding template was applied to all the
free text data by three researchers (KL, AT, JTR). Codes were drawn
together into themes through discussion amongst the research team. In
this initial analysis, ‘experiences of the RO role’ was identified as a key
theme, with respondents discussing the nature of their role, both in
response to questions asking specifically about their revalidation deci-
sion-making practices but also in response to other survey questions.
Recognising ROs as holding a key role in medical regulation, we
undertook the in-depth theoretically-driven analysis of this themed data
reported here. In this analysis, MB and KL revisited the data relating to
ROs' experiences of and reflections on their role, and identified nuanced
subthemes about ROs' work and perspectives. This involved moving
iteratively between the data and the theoretical literature outlined
above to refine our analysis, drawing on the varied disciplinary ex-
pertise of the wider team, including medical education, sociology, and
organisational research. Such an approach has previously been used
successfully to develop theoretical contributions from existing em-
pirical datasets (Martin et al., 2015). Reporting qualitative survey data
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separately has also been demonstrated to be an effective way to explore
views across a population of interest (Dale et al., 2016) and as pro-
viding adequate data to support theory driven interpretations of pro-
fessional activities (Entwistle and Matthews, 2015). In this case, the
high response rate overall resulted in broad coverage across a cohort
little studied elsewhere, and provided sufficient content to support this
exploratory analysis of the RO role. However, the lower response rate
from ROs in smaller organisations and locum agencies may mean these
perspectives are less well represented in our analysis. As not all re-
spondents provided responses to all free text questions, raising ques-
tions of non-response, we have not sought to generalise our findings,
but have focused on emerging concepts.
We present our findings with illustrative quotations and information
about respondents' job roles and organisational type to provide context,
broadly categorised to maintain anonymity as ‘NHS secondary care’, for
example, or ‘independent provider’ for private, for-profit healthcare
organisations.
2.1. Findings
Our findings centre on three themes: firstly, the RO function, pro-
fessional hierarchy and hybridity; secondly, ROs' regulatory decision-
making and professional accountability; and finally, ROs' reflections on
the role and its impacts.
2.2. ROs, professional hierarchy and hybridity
Firstly, we sought to understand whether ROs form a distinct elite
group within the professional hierarchy of UK medicine. Within the
data, 109 ROs made comments about their role relating to their dis-
ciplinary power. Such comments often emphasised the separation be-
tween them and the doctors under their authority:
… The doctors do regard the RO as someone to keep in with. I am seen as
firm but fair and helpful. Dealing with some difficult cases with com-
passion and realism leads to wider respect in the community. Being very
strict with some game-players leads to a serious ethos in the Trust.
(RO53, RO, NHS Secondary Care)
As in this instance, many ROs discussed themselves and their work
from the perspective of others, describing how they thought others
perceived them. Here the RO function is presented as having enhanced
and strengthened the MD role, which a majority of respondents also
held:
… some slightly greater engagement with doctors but I think they all now
associate the Medical Director with being a policeman/headmaster/op-
pressor. (RO381, RO/Medical Director, NHS Secondary Care)
… Doctors feel they are more dependent on me, as they think their
professional fate is in my hands (slightly wrong perception). (RO222,
RO/Medical Director, NHS Mental Healthcare)
Adopting the perspective of the ‘other’ in this way emphasises the
relational nature of stratification in the profession (Waring, 2014),
where groupings are identified as much by their relationships to and
differences from each other, as by internal characteristics. We found
evidence, therefore, that ROs see themselves as set apart from other
doctors. Notably, respondents used terminology imbued with notions of
power and authority, invoking explicitly hierarchical ideas of oversight
and discipline.
Occasionally, respondents offered reflections about the role and the
potential for some ROs to wield this authority unfairly by persecuting
doctors:
Some ROs seem to be on a mission to weed out bad doctors, or those they
consider to be bad doctors, and have a lot of power - the system is open to
prejudice (some of which I have seen). I don't know what can be done
about this. The role of RO might attract the type of individual who wishes
to judge others … (RO376, RO/Clinical Director, Independent pro-
vider)
We also found that respondents commented on differences between
their prior experience of medical management and being an RO, iden-
tifying the advent of the RO role as a change. With ROs having iden-
tified that their oversight role may arouse apprehension amongst other
doctors, and that the powers they hold have the potential to be misused,
some respondents felt unease about the role, though the reasons for this
unease differed:
I became RO after revalidation was introduced. It gives the MD a lot of
(unwelcome) power. (RO271, RO/Medical Director, NHS Secondary
Care)
[Being RO] Has raised my profile and generally heightened my aware-
ness of issues around professionalism. I also have a greater sense of
potential for personal exposure, which is not particularly pleasant …
(RO215, RO/Deputy Medical Director NHS Secondary Care)
Again, RO work is presented as a change from the MD role with the
distinctly regulatory nature of ROs' responsibilities bringing an added
dimension to this new hybrid group's work.
We also found less direct allusions to oversight, with respondents
commenting on the increased leverage the role offers to bring about
doctors' compliance with expected standards. The application of au-
thority was seen in references to ROs' ability to drive up standards
through quality improvement and performance management:
I think that the RO role gives us an important quality improvement tool
… (RO163, RO/Medical Director, NHS England Area Team)
Probably more ‘strict’ about encouraging professionalism amongst all
doctors. I feel that it has given me a useful ‘lever’ to encourage doctors to
improve performance … (RO33, RO/Medical Director, NHS
Secondary Care)
Within the data pertaining to power and hierarchy, we found 61
respondents made allusions to a regulatory discourse of performance
management, focused on individual doctors' adherence to standards
(Archer et al., 2015). We also identified an equivalent number of re-
spondents (n= 53) who referred to a quality improvement discourse,
previously identified elsewhere as used by managerial elites (McGivern
et al., 2015).
We found further evidence of managerialism in ROs' comments
noting that they had been able to focus their colleagues on wider or-
ganisational goals:
… RO formal responsibility has helped focus the mind of all staff and the
board on quality. (RO308, RO, Independent provider)
I have become more central to the work of all the doctors at [organi-
sation name] […] There is a sense that the doctors in the organisation,
with me as their representative and RO, are more aligned to the orga-
nisational goals than previously. (RO109, RO/Medical Director,
Mental health charity)
These respondents felt that the RO role had impacted on medical
work within their organisations, and whilst these ROs were based in
non-NHS organisations, we found allusions to quality improvement and
organisational agendas from across healthcare settings:
I now have a much stronger grip on the performance and conduct of
doctors, and have been able to use the needs of appraisal and revalida-
tion to bring about a number of quality improvements that have bene-
fitted the whole organisation. (RO241, RO/Medical Director, NHS
Community)
This RO was one of sixteen who referred to both a regulatory dis-
course of performance management, and the managerialist focus on
quality improvement in their comments demonstrating how these two
logics can converge in RO work.
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In these instances, ROs are consciously using their position of au-
thority to encourage doctors to focus on particular organisational
priorities. This convergence of discourses (Olakivi and Niska, 2017)
demonstrates ROs' significance both within organisational management
structures, as well as within the professional hierarchy, whilst also
emphasising the novel regulatory dimension of their hybridity.
2.3. Regulatory decision-making and professional accountability
With many ROs identifying themselves as having a distinct position
and authority over other doctors in their organisations, we found the
specifically regulatory character of their work foregrounded in com-
ments from 117 respondents relating to their revalidation decision-
making responsibilities. Our findings in this domain shed further light
on how ROs operate to fulfil their regulatory responsibilities, meet or-
ganisational priorities, and navigate the multi-faceted nature of their
work.
Discussing operational aspects of RO work, some expressed trepi-
dation about their responsibility for judging other doctors' perfor-
mance, or general apathy from doctors:
It's [revalidation] complicated and doctors just don't get it and they have
no respect for it. Hard slog to engage them, my team are often in the
firing line … (RO307, RO/Medical Director, Independent provider)
Whilst many respondents had made deferrals or dealt with concerns
about individual doctors, in a small number of cases ROs reported
having been brought into conflict as a result of their decision-making:
I have had an issue with an individual where a deferral was required who
threatened to resign and leave if I did not change my opinion […] it
created a significant tension between myself and the CEO who was fo-
cused on the bottom line. (RO125, RO/ Medical Director, Independent
provider)
Whilst not common, such comments do demonstrate the potential
for ROs to face defensive reactions from individual doctors, but also
that there may be limitations upon ROs' authority within their organi-
sation. The priorities of an organisation's executive leadership may at
times conflict with regulatory demands, perhaps especially in an in-
dependent organisation focused on revenue.
Although the majority of respondents appeared relatively satisfied
with the process of making recommendations, others sounded notes of
caution, highlighting the varying degrees of knowledge ROs might have
about the doctors concerned:
It relies on knowledge of the individual doctor and their reputation as
well as the appraisal evidence. I would be reluctant to revalidate a doctor
I don't know in this way. (RO308, RO, Independent provider)
I work across a multi-centre organisation, and often have never met my
doctors even [when] making recommendations … (RO307, RO/
Medical Director, Independent provider)
Such comments show the importance of organisational context,
particularly organisational size, in shaping ROs' experiences of the role,
and also suggest that the information available to them may differ
considerably. These comments echo findings from early work on re-
validation which highlighted the variety of ways in which revalidation
decisions could be made (Webster and McLachlan, 2011).
The legislation associated with revalidation assigns accountability
for monitoring medical performance to the RO personally, rather than
to healthcare organisations corporately. Where comments within the
data pertaining to decision-making addressed this issue directly, ROs
were divided about whether they should be solely responsible for
making revalidation recommendations, or whether that task should be
shared or delegated. Thirty-three respondents particularly stressed the
importance of personal responsibility:
The workload involved in making the recommendations is large and I
currently don't have the confidence to delegate this to anyone else
(probably quite rightly). (RO77, RO/Medical Director, NHS
Secondary Care)
Conversely, 37 respondents, mostly although not exclusively
working in organisations with larger numbers of doctors, such as sec-
ondary care and mental health hospitals, specified that they had es-
tablished decision-making groups to assist in making recommendations.
One went so far as to argue that in large organisations, the RO role
should be abolished and accountability transferred to a team:
… the job of RO is virtually impossible to do well - and ends up being too
reliant on quality of appraisal, which is variable … I would take away
the single RO post completely and make the job a responsibility of the
medical governance team … (RO376, RO/Clinical Director,
Independent provider)
Though we cannot generalise from the proportions within the data,
these data do show that ROs' shared regulatory responsibilities can be
experienced in varied ways, and that variation may be due to organi-
sational context or size, or to ROs' individual preferences.
The authority of the RO role brings with it significant responsibility,
and responses to this are mixed with some tensions arising from this
evident in our data. The RO embodies this regulatory responsibility in a
wholly new way, and the decision-making about other doctors' per-
formance required by revalidation differentiates their work from that of
other doctor-managers.
2.4. Becoming ‘responsible’: reflections on regulatory work
The impact that doing the regulatory work of an RO had on re-
spondents was a major theme within the data, with both positive and
negative changes identified. Workload was discussed by 114 re-
spondents to the survey and, whilst not surprising as the survey focused
on the impacts of implementing revalidation, within this data we
identified comments highlighting that ROs' regulatory work was often
an addition to other roles. Only eleven respondents stated that the
impact on their workload had been minor, and almost all of those
worked for organisations with small numbers of connected doctors. The
majority of comments noted that RO work had added burden to their
working lives:
It has taken up a lot of time. Other things in my portfolio have not been
given full attention as a result. (RO367, RO/Deputy Medical Director,
NHS Secondary Care)
It has introduced a significant amount of additional administration and
takes up time that would be far better spent doing the job I am employed
to do. (RO237, RO, Medical defence organisation)
The latter respondent here appears to regard the RO role as imposed
upon them, contrasting it with their other work, though they did not
give information about their other work. Individuals working as ROs
can often hold the role concurrently with other roles, be that the MD
role as for the majority of survey respondents, or continued clinical
practice, for instance. This brings additional complexity to notions of
professional hybridity, as acquiring managerial or governance respon-
sibilities does not mean that other working commitments are necessa-
rily set aside. Our data suggest that balancing multiple roles brings
practical challenges of time and workload, and may also create tension
in terms of identity formation or fluidity.
Forty-eight respondents indicated that assuming the RO role had
increased their professional standing within organisational hierarchies
and brought greater co-operation with colleagues due to the extension
of formal governance processes embedding revalidation into wider
management structures:
The RO role has assisted in much closer and better working with medical
leaders and the Board/ across the organisation. (RO117, RO/Medical
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Director, Independent provider)
I have respect from the team and the CEO for the decisions I have made
on the doctors so far. (RO195, RO, Locum agency)
Again, the relational nature of RO identity work is evident. Whereas
ROs described their power and authority in reference to other doctors,
here they refer to their status in organisational management structures.
Less frequently, respondents reflected on their own personal de-
velopment:
As it affects me personally, more transparency about my own perfor-
mance; I've done more CPD; I've sought evidence about my outcomes;
ensured mandatory training done, etc … (RO295, RO/Deputy Medical
Director, NHS Secondary Care)
I have developed increased resilience. I have learned a lot from other ROs
in NHS England … I have realised that we need to harness the leadership
skills of several layers of medical management to get the job done because
it is so massive one person can't do everything. (RO148, RO/Medical
Director, NHS England Area Team)
In this instance, the respondent positions themselves at the apex of a
hierarchy of medical management within an organisation, and cites the
importance of interaction and knowledge exchange with their RO
counterparts. Others too identified interaction with RO peers as having
been beneficial. In particular, there were references to RO network
meetings, organised by NHS England to bring ROs together to discuss
best practice and share learning:
The Regional and National Network meetings are by far the best forum
for learning, developing and being supported. They are absolutely es-
sential in my opinion. (RO355, RO/Medical Director, Independent
provider)
Of the seventy-four ROs who mentioned network meetings, all but
four were positive about their value, though a few noted a preference
for regional or sector-specific meetings over large national-level gath-
erings.
Organised network meetings bring ROs together as colleagues, in a
way which seems to positively reinforce their sense of being a distinct
occupational group, contributing to the formation of a specifically ‘RO’
group identity, as distinct from the broader cadre of doctor-managers.
Moreover, the existence of formalised RO to RO information-sharing
channels (Revalidation Support Team, 2013), designates the RO as the
conduit for medical performance related exchanges between organisa-
tions. In this way, as well as sitting at the intersection between an or-
ganisation and the professional regulator, doctors holding the RO role
may form a new web of interactions across organisational boundaries.
3. Discussion
Regulatory reform, particularly the advent of revalidation, has de-
cisively changed the way oversight of the UK medical profession op-
erates (Archer et al., 2017; Tazzyman et al., 2018). This has variously
been seen as an extension of bureaucratic-scientific medicine
(Greenhalgh and Wong, 2011) and an increase in governmental control
(Chamberlain, 2014). Within this changed environment, ROs hold a key
position, entrusted with evaluating the performance of their medical
colleagues, and providing a link between medical work in organisa-
tional settings and the national professional regulator. The findings
presented in this paper demonstrate firstly that ROs' responsibility for
monitoring the performance of other doctors within organisations has
altered the professional hierarchy, entrenching a divide between ROs as
a ‘governance elite’ group (Waring, 2014) and the ‘rank and file’ doc-
tors subject to their oversight.
In terms of professional structure, we found evidence that ROs both
distinguish the RO role from other managerial work, and that they
describe the position of the RO in relation to other groups (Waring,
2014). Notably, ROs typically described themselves as set apart from
and above the doctors whose performance they oversee, and explicitly
characterised the relationship between themselves and other doctors in
their organisation in terms of their own authority within that dynamic.
The regulatory decision-making tasks central to the RO role therefore
both alter power dynamics within the profession and give a distinctive
regulatory, or governance, character to this elite group.
ROs also positioned themselves in relation to local healthcare
management structures, highlighting that their regulatory responsi-
bilities are conducted in particular organisational contexts. In common,
therefore, with purely managerial roles, the RO function is organisa-
tionally situated, and experiences of the role are necessarily shaped by
the nature of the organisation, echoing findings from earlier studies
(Nath, 2013; Webster and McLachlan, 2011). Our findings show that
ROs' regulatory decision-making about doctors' performance is medi-
ated by organisational context, with organisational size for example,
impacting on the burden of work, and the amount of information
available about doctors varying between settings.
The RO has come to embody accountability for medical perfor-
mance within organisations, balancing authority over rank and file
doctors with their responsibilities to the GMC as external regulator.
Fig. 1 sets out lines of regulatory oversight and professional account-
ability which position ROs above other doctors in their organisations in
a professional hierarchy within their organisational context, but also
show that the GMC exerts its regulatory power both over ROs them-
selves, and through them over the profession as a whole. Revalidation,
as on-going process encompassing all doctors, has strengthened reg-
ulatory oversight, with ROs being the nexus between the organisa-
tional, regulatory and professional spheres.
Our study sheds light on how ROs undertake their work, identifying
that some ROs draw upon a quality improvement agenda underpinned
by a managerialist logic, or see their role as being to improve doctors'
performance in order to promote professionalism. This latter discourse
appears to emanate from a regulatory logic focused on remedying ap-
parent performance deficits (Archer et al., 2015). A similar mix of
discourses has been identified elsewhere in work focused on doctor-
managers (McGivern et al., 2015), and suggests that where profes-
sionals take on managerial or governance responsibilities, they can
draw upon different motivations, though these may overlap or converge
(Noordegraaf et al., 2016; Olakivi and Niska, 2017). However, we
found less evidence of purely professional notions of shared values and
approaches to practice, though this may be a consequence of our ana-
lysis arising from a survey focused on the implementation of revalida-
tion, a regulatory process.
Fig. 1. The RO as nexus between organisation, profession and regulator.
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Our findings reveal, therefore, that ROs' role in relation to the
profession represents structural restratification (Waring, 2014), but that
the discourses which frame their work draw more upon managerial and
regulatory logics than those emanating from within the profession.
Although the RO role preserves a core regulatory function for qualified
doctors, the surveillance of the profession they undertake serves to fa-
cilitate the advancement of agendas largely determined externally, ra-
ther than bolstering professional autonomy in any meaningful way.
Indeed, ROs' hybrid nature, necessitated by their position at the con-
fluence of three co-existing logics (McDonald et al., 2013), means that
analyses suggesting homogenous resistance to regulatory power
(Spendlove, 2018) ignore the nuances of professional strata.
Our study contributes to the literature on hybrid healthcare pro-
fessionalism. Existing studies on restratification and hybridity have
typically focused on those in doctor-manager positions – the managerial
elite – where the focus of their work is on delivering healthcare services
(Kuhlmann et al., 2013; McGivern et al., 2015). Our research evidences
for the first time that ROs' regulatory responsibilities bring a distinct
dimension to their experiences and to their emergent group identity.
Whilst many ROs hold an MD role too, our analysis indicates that the
regulatory focus of RO work, especially making revalidation re-
commendations, distinguishes it from the doctor-manager work studied
elsewhere. Our analysis extends understandings of professional hy-
bridity, moving beyond binary ‘medical/managerial’ hybrids to look at
the complex interplay of multiple intra- and extra-professional agendas.
The convergence of professional hierarchy, managerial status, and
regulatory responsibilities that define the RO role point to the emer-
gence of a distinctly regulatory form of hybrid professionalism.
Whilst recognising the limitations of survey data, particularly the
brevity of some responses, and the lack of opportunity for immediate
follow-up, in this instance the high response rate yielded rich qualita-
tive data for analysis. This analysis has, however, highlighted a number
of avenues that warrant further in depth exploration, including notably
some of the professional, contextual and social factors underlying RO
behaviour. For example, how and why individuals come to take on elite
professional roles is worthy of further attention. Likewise, research
could shed more light on the issue of RO identity formation, at both
individual and group levels. However, our findings also suggest that
some ROs felt that their regulatory tasks detracted from other areas of
their work, particularly clinical responsibilities. For many, RO work is
only one element of a portfolio of roles held concurrently, which may
encompass clinical, educational, or wider managerial aspects; and our
findings arise from a questionnaire particularly focused on the reg-
ulatory dimension. We might, therefore, seek to better understand how
continuing to practise clinically whilst overseeing others' medical
practice impacts on the formation of hybrid professional identity.
Finally, whilst our focus here has been solely on ROs' experiences from
their own perspective, a more rounded understanding of this group
would result from bringing in the voices of those that they oversee, and
their colleagues in organisational management, including other doctor-
managers and non-clinical colleagues.
4. Conclusion
Our findings highlight the importance of ROs as a distinct group of
hybrid professionals, forming a governance elite and a new locus of
power in UK medicine. However, whilst the emergence of this group
represents a restructuring of the medical profession, the regulatory
focus of their activities and the lines of power and accountability be-
tween the wider profession and the GMC that operate through them,
suggest that the RO function is not one which primarily acts in defence
of professional autonomy. Rather, ROs' work, and their attitudes to-
wards fulfilling their core task of monitoring other doctors' fitness to
practise, seem likely to expand professional regulation into the orga-
nisational sphere in new ways. Understanding ROs' developing role at
the confluence of regulatory, organisational and professional agendas
offers an opportunity to explore the on-going development of pro-
fessionalism in an era of strengthened governance and complex policy
change.
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